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INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: SUPREME COURT DECIDES THE

MEANING OF "GIVES RISE TO A CLAIM" AND
"FOREIGN TRIBUNAL"

Robert E. Draba*
I.

Introduction

Since 1991, there has been tremendous growth in the number of countries that
have antitrust laws and agencies.' In 1991, only a handful of nations had antitrust laws that were actively enforced. By 2001, more than 100 nations had such
laws. 2 Perhaps, no other regulatory scheme has spread so far, so fast. Antitrust
enforcement is now found throughout the world, 3 and "market principles, deregulation, and respect for competitive forces have been broadly embraced .... 4
Because business transactions are international in scope, 5 there are ongoing
efforts to achieve greater substantive and procedural convergence in international
antitrust policy. 6 Having antitrust laws everywhere at once is of little value if
global competition. The failed Honeywell/
they do not work together to advance
7
GE merger illustrates this point.
No doubt, the process of harmonizing antitrust laws on a worldwide basis will
proceed incrementally for years to come. 8 For example, there remains uncertainty as to whether an existing global entity like the World Trade Organization
*
Robert Draba is a Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, a
Fellow of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and a Judge Hubert L. Will Student Fellow. In
memory of Frances Muharsky Draba, 1914-2004.
1 Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
InternationalAntitrust In The 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, Address at the OECD Global

Forum on Competition, Paris, France, October 17, 2001. U.S. Department of Justice, Advanced Corporate Compliance Workshop 2002, 1291 PLI/CoRP 827, 860 (2002).
2 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade And Commerce Or
Runaway Regulation?, 26-FALL FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 59, 60 (2002).
3

James, supra note 1, at 860.

4 Id.

5 John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects And The Need For
An InternationalAntitrust Response From The World Trade Organization:A Case Study In BroadcastMedia And News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.41, 43 (2000); see also, Quaak v. Klynveld

Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) ("In an increasingly global
economy, commercial transactions involving participants from many lands have become common fare.").
6 Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy In Ukraine, 31 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 1, 44 (1997) ("Some antitrust scholars have recently proposed that national antitrust laws should
converge into a single, consistent, international antitrust law."); James, supra note 1, at 857-61.
7 Matt Murray et. a]., Oceans Apart: As Honeywell Deal Goes Awry for GE, Fallout May Be Global,

ST. J., June 15, 2001, at Al, available at Westlaw, 6/15/01 WSJ Al.
Spencer Weber Waller, The InternationalizationOf Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343,
404 (1997) ("Harmonization in the antitrust area continues more by way of accretion than design.").
WALL

8
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should be the focus of promulgating international competition policy or whether
a new and separate international agency should be established. 9
Nonetheless, issues involving international antitrust emerge and require resolution, as exemplified this past term when the United States Supreme Court
("Court") decided two cases involving such issues. First, in F. Hoffman-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 10 ("Empagran"), the Court clarified the phrase,
"gives rise to a claim," within the meaning of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA"). Second, in Intel Corporation v. Advanced
Micro Devices'" ("Intel"), the Court clarified whether the Directorate General of
is a "foreign tribunal" within the meaning of section 1782 of
the European Union
12
the Judicial Code.
This note discusses both cases. Part II focuses on Empagran, which involves a
question of subject matter jurisdiction and stands for the proposition that "where
the defendant's conduct affects both domestic and foreign commerce, but the
plaintiff's injury arises only from the conduct's foreign effect and not its domestic effect, the plaintiff's injury is independent from the domestic effect and the
court has no jurisdiction."' 3 This rule means that a global conspiracy's effect on
domestic commerce must give rise to the plaintiff's claim. 14 Part III focuses on
Intel, which involves the discovery of documents in the United States in connection with a proceeding in a "foreign tribunal" and stands for the proposition that
Section 1782 of the Judicial Code "authorizes, but does not require, a federal
assistance to foreign or international tribunals...
district court to provide judicial
' 5
in proceedings abroad."'
Part IV takes a closer look at cases that have been decided since the Court
issued its opinions. They provide early indications of how trial courts and courts
of appeal apply the rules announced in Empagran and Intel. In addition, Part IV
takes a quick look at the issue of comity in these cases. Comity is a doctrine that
takes into account "foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and the
mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime." ' 6 In Empagran, the Court emphasized the importance of comity, but in
Intel, the Court minimized its importance.
9 Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust And InternationalRegulatory Federalism,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142,
1143 (2001).
10 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) [hereinafter "Empagran II"].
124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004) [hereinafter "Intel II"].
12 Assistance to Foreign and International Tribunals and to Litigants Before Such Tribunals, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1782 (1996); see also Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2473 ("Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence
"1

for use in foreign tribunals.").
13 MM Global Serv. v. Dow Chem., 2004 WL 1792461, *4 (D.Conn. Aug. 11, 2004) (summarizing
the rule of Empagran II ).
14 See Sniado v. Bank Aus. AG, 378 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing Empagran II).
15 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2473.
16 Comity Socitd Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Part V concludes that both Empagran and Intel will help achieve greater procedural convergence in international antitrust policy, but also cautions that "[i]t's
tough to make predictions, especially about the future."' 7 The ramifications of
domestic antitrust decisions can be difficult to anticipate at the time they are
decided,' 8 and there is no reason to believe that the ramifications of these international antitrust decisions would be any less difficult to anticipate. At the very
least, though, the Supreme Court in Empagran and Intel, respectively, provided
more clarity regarding subject matter jurisdiction and discovery in international
antitrust matters.
Empagran Clarifies "Gives Rise to a Claim"

II.

Empagran is an antitrust case brought by foreign purchasers of vitamins products against foreign and domestic companies that distribute and sell these vitamin
products around the world. 19 The plaintiff-purchasers alleged that defendantcompanies engaged
[in] an over-arching worldwide conspiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices of vitamins; that this cartel operated on a global basis and
affected virtually every market where [defendants] operated worldwide;
and that [their] unlawful price-fixing conduct had adverse effects in the
in conUnited States and in other nations that caused injury to appellants
20
nection with their foreign purchases of vitamin products.
The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case because
"the injuries plaintiffs sought to redress were allegedly sustained in transactions
that lack any direct connection to United States commerce." 2 1 The D.C. Circuit
reversed, 22 holding that "FTAIA permits suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely by that conduct's effect on foreign commerce. 23 But, "[t]he anticompetitive conduct itself must violate the Sherman Act and the conduct's harmful
effect of United States commerce must give rise to 'a claim' by someone, even if
not the foreign plaintiff who is before the court."'24 The Court granted certiorari
essentially to clarify the meaning of the FTAIA phrase, "gives rise to a claim."
17 See William E. Lee, Facts, Assumptions and American Pie, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
239, 252 n.61 (2000) (stating that this comment is sometimes attributed to Yogi Berra).
18 See Deborah A. Garza, 25 Years Later: Walking in the Footsteps of Brunswick,Illinois Brick, and
Sylvania, 17 ANTITRUST 7, 7 (2002).
19 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 2003 WL 22734815 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2003) (No. 03-0724) [hereinafter "Empagran I"].
20 Id. at 340.

21 Id.
22 Id. at 360.
23 Id. at 350.
24

Id.
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A.

Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act

To help U.S. companies compete more effectively in foreign markets, 2 5 to
reduce the potential antitrust liability of U.S. companies working together to
compete in foreign markets, 26 and to clarify the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws of the United States, 27 Congress amended the Sherman Act 2 8 with the
FTAIA of 1982.29 It provides in pertinent part that the Sherman Act "shall not
apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (except import trade or commerce)
with foreign nations" unless (1) such foreign conduct "has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce, and (2) the effect of such
30
conduct on domestic conduct "gives rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act.
The first prong of the two-pronged exception seen above requires a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. This requirement is not controversial. It is axiomatic that where there is no harm, there can
be no foul. School boys in Indiana playing pick-up basketball have understood
and applied this "rule of law" for generations with absolutely no guidance from
the Court. Hence, the FTAIA shields a defendant who engages in anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets as long as that anticompetitive conduct does not
31
have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.
Conversely, the FTAIA provides an avenue of action for a U.S. plaintiff injured
by a defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct in foreign commerce that adversely affects U.S. commerce.
The origin of the requirement of an effect on U.S. commerce is found in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. 32 In that case, Judge Learned Hand
promulgated the so-called "effects test,"' 33 thereby resolving whether Congress
intended to impose liability for anticompetitive conduct outside the United
States. Judge Hand announced that the Sherman Act was limited to acts intended
to affect U.S. imports and did in fact affect them. 3 4 He pointedly rejected that the
25 Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the World: Jurisdiction and
Standing Issues in TransnationalLitigation, 14 LoY.CONSUMER L. REv. 523, 529-31 (2002).
26 See United Phosphorus. Ltd. v. ANGUS Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir. 2003) ("iTlhe
legislative history shows that jurisdiction stripping is what Congress had in mind in enacting the

FTAIA.").
27 James R. Atwood & Christopher D. Oatway, Foreign-Market Claims, 25 NAT'L L.J. 37 (2003),
available on Westlaw at 5/5/03 NLJ B8, (col. 1).
28 Section One of the Sherman Act is the foundation of American antitrust law. "It proscribes any
contract or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations." Liam D.
Scully, Antitrust Law-Section One Of The Sherman Act Extends CriminalLiability To Conduct Committed Wholly Outside Of The United States, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 977, 977 (1998).
29 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
30 Id.
31 Kareen O'Brien, Giving Rise to a Claim: Is FTAIA 's Section 6a(2) An Antitrust Plaintiffs Key To
The Courthouse Door?, 9 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 421, 422-23 (2002-03).
32 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 n.24
(1993) ("Sherman Act covers foreign conduct producing a substantial intended effect in the United
States ... ").
33 United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946-47.
34 Id.
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to anticompetitive conduct that had no consequences within
Sherman Act applied
35
the United States.
The second prong of the FTAIA requires that the effect of anticompetitive
conduct in foreign markets on domestic commerce "gives rise to a claim" under
the Sherman Act. By contrast with the first prong that involves no dispute, there
36
was a Circuit split about the meaning of the phrase, "gives rise to a claim.
37
A Split in the Circuits

B.

In Den Norske,38 the Fifth Circuit held that "gives rise to a claim" refers specifically to the plaintiffs claim. 39 Consequently, only claims arising from the
U.S. effect of the anti-competitive conduct are actionable. Injured consumers in
U.S. commerce may state a claim that allows U.S. courts to have jurisdiction, but
a claim even if they are affected by
consumers in foreign markets may not state
40
the very same anticompetitive conduct.
Accordingly, the Den Norske court upheld the dismissal of a Norwegian oil
company's claim that it paid inflated prices for heavy-lift barge services in nonU.S. waters (the North Sea), but it permitted claims of companies injured by the
4 1 To the
very same anticompetitive conduct in U.S. waters (Gulf of Mexico).
Fifth Circuit, a FTAIA claim requires that the "direct, substantial, and reasonably
Sherforeseeable effect" on U.S. commerce gives rise to "the" claim under the
42
man Act and not "a" claim unrelated to the effect on U.S. Commerce.
In Kruman,43 the Second Circuit reached a different conclusion. Kruman involved allegations of price fixing against two major auction houses, Christie's
International and Sotheby's Holdings. It was a class action on behalf of persons
who bought or sold items at auction outside the United States. 44 The District
Court stated that "The fundamental question here is whether a transnational price
fixing conspiracy that affects commerce both in the United States and in other
countries inevitably gives persons injured abroad in transactions otherwise un35

Id.

36 Ryan A. Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International Cartels by
Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 100-01 (2003).
37 Id. (discussing this circuit split succinctly and clearly).
38 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied
sub nom. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
39 See Michael D. Blechman, RelationshipsAmong Competitors, 1370 PLI/CoRP 121, 161-64 (2003).
40 Atwood & Oatway, supra note 27.
41 Id.

42 Salil K. Mehra, "A " Is ForAnachronism: The FTAIA Meets the World Trading System, 107 DICK.
L. REV. 763, 765-66 (2003).
43 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
44 Id. at 399; see also Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein, U.S. Antitrust Laws: Who Can Sue
Whom?, New York Law Journal, July 20, 2004, available on Westlaw at 7/20/2004 N.Y.L.J. 3, (col. 1)
(succinctly summarizing Empagran II and its background); Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, Sherman
Act, Section 7, 1 LrIGATION OF INT'L DistrrEs INU.S. COURTS § 5:13 (2004) ("U.S. plaintiffs settled
their cases leaving only the foreign plaintiffs.").
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connected with the United States a remedy under our antitrust laws."'45 In granting defendants' motion to dismiss, the District Court refused to "to impute4 6 to
Congress an intention to establish an antitrust regimen to cover the world."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, rejecting the lower court's position
that "plaintiffs injured abroad by anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign markets are barred from suit under the FTAIA. . . ,,47 According to the Second
Circuit, the FTAIA grants wide jurisdiction over foreign parties. 48 The plaintiff
only needs to show that the effect on U.S. commerce violated the Sherman Act to
satisfy the "gives rise to a claim" requirement and to give U.S. courts jurisdiction. 49 Simply stated, the Second Circuit held that "a violation of the Sherman
Act is not predicated on the existence of an injury51 to the plaintiff," 50 a position
which the Court decidedly rejected in Empagran.
Opinion of the D.C. Circuit in Empagran

C.

Landing somewhere in between Den Norske and Kruman,52 the D.C. Circuit
opined that "giving rise to a claim" simply means that "some private person or
entity has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the United States
effect of the defendant's violation of the Sherman Act."'53 Further, as long as
another private party has a potential Sherman Act claim arising from an effect on
domestic commerce, then the claim before the court need not arise from the domestic effect. 54 The FTAIA "allows a foreign plaintiff to bring suit in U.S.
courts when a global conspiracy has effects in the United States that 'give rise' to
a Sherman Act claim, even if the foreign plaintiff's injury cannot be attributed to
the U.S. effect." 55 To the D.C. Circuit, "as long as someone has a claim based on
effects on U.S. commerce, any injured party can sue in the United
the requisite
56
States."
In her dissent, Judge Henderson of the D.C. Circuit stated that she would have
adhered to the Fifth Circuit's holding in Den Norske, and she added that "[t]he
45

Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Id. at 624 ("There is no basis for imputing such an intent.").
Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA And Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Foreign Transactions
Under The Antitrust Laws: The New FrontierIn Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. Rav. 2151, 2172-73
(2003).
48 Andrew Stanger, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Foreign PartiesAfter EmpagranS.A.
V. F. Hoffinan-Laroche, Ltd., 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (2003).
49 Id.
50 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d at 399.
46
47

51 See Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004) (holding that the Sherman Act does not apply when
"the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effects").
52 Andrews Antitrust Litig. Reporter, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: D.C. Cir. Reinstates Foreign Vitamin Purchasers' Antitrust Lawsuit, 10 No. 10 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LmG. REP. 7
(2003).
53 Empagran I, 315 F.3d at 352.
54 Atwood & Oatway, supra note 27.
55 Andrews Antitrust Litig. Reporter, supra note 52.
56 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 44.
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majority decides whether a court has jurisdiction over claims asserted by a plaintiff in one action by reference to a hypothetical claim another party could, perin some other proceeding. '57 "This," she observed, "seems a peculiar
haps, raise
58
notion."
The D.C. Circuit asked the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States with respect to a rehearing en banc in Empagran.59 In the Solicitor
General's brief in support of a rehearing, the Solicitor General disagreed with the
panel's ruling in Empagran,stating that the "most natural reading" of the FTAIA
"is that the requisite anticompetitive effects on domestic commerce must give
rise to the claim brought by the particular plaintiff before the court."' 60 However,
the D.C. Circuit denied a hearing en banc in Empagran, leaving the matter for the
U.S. Supreme Court to resolve.
D.

The U.S. Supreme Court's View

Writing for a unanimous Court,6 1 Mr. Justice Breyer stated that a plaintiff
must allege that the conspiracy's effect on domestic commerce gave rise to the
plaintiffs claim. 62 Accordingly, the Court vacated the decision of the D.C. Circuit, 63 abrogated the decision of the Second Circuit in Kruman,64 and announced
that the FTAIA "does not apply where the plaintiff's claim rests solely on the
independent foreign harm."'65 The Court made two points in its decision. 66 First,
the holding avoids unreasonable interference with the sovereign interests of other
countries. 67 Second, it comports with the legislative history of the FTAIA, which
the Court opined was not intended "to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act's scope as applied to foreign commerce. '68
1. Sovereign interests of other countries
The Court "construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations."'69 Because the FTAIA is ambiguous, the Court applied a traditional rule of statutory construction: "legislation of
57 Empagran I, 315 F.3d at 360 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
58 Id.

59 See Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 03-724 2003
WL 22762741,at *7-8 (Nov. 13, 2003).
60 Id.
61 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate.
62 See Sniado v. Bank Aus. AG, 378 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing Empagran II).
63 Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2372.
64 Sniado, 378 F.3d at 212 (stating that Empagran II abrogated the Second Circuit's decision in
Kruman).
65 Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2363
66 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 44.
67 Empagran II, 124 S.Ct. at 2369.
68 Id.

69 Id. at 2366.
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Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."'70 This rule of construction "cautions
courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests
of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony-a harmony par'71 To the
ticularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.
Court, "if America's antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have
' 72
tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.
Comports with the legislative history

2.

The Court also reviewed the legislative history of the FTAIA, concluding that
"Congress would not have intended the FTAIA's exception to bring indepen'7 3
dently caused foreign injury within the Sherman Act's reach." Specifically, the
Court could find "no significant indication that at the time Congress wrote this
statute courts would have thought the Sherman Act applicable in these circumstances." Moreover, the Solicitor General who supported the petitioner could
applied the Sherman Act to redress foreign
find no cases "in which any court
74
circumstances.
injury in such
Respondents, however, cited three cases decided by the Supreme Court and
three others decided by lower courts, which the Court reviewed seriatim. Regarding the cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Court observed that none
addressed whether "foreign private plaintiffs could have obtained foreign relief
' 75
As to cases debased solely upon such independently caused foreign injury.
cided by lower courts, the Court observed that none provided "significant author76
ity for application of the Sherman Act in the circumstances we here assume."
In contrast, the Court cited "a leading contemporaneous lower court case" that
conduct be "sufficiently large to
emphasizes that the domestic effect of foreign
77
present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs."
Linguistic Sense

3.

In sum, the Court concluded that it "makes linguistic sense to read the words
'a claim' as if they refer to the 'plaintiff's claim' or 'the claim at issue."' To the
Court, this interpretation of the phrase, "a claim" is consistent with the basic
70 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
7! Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2366.
72 Id. at 2369; see also Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 44 ("Germany, Belgium, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Japan all filed briefs in support of the defendants . .
73 Empagran H1,124 S. Ct. at 2371.
74 Id. at 2369.

75 Id. at 2370.
76 Id. at 2372.
77
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intent of FTAIA as understood in the context of comity and history. Where "the
inconsistent with
statute's language reasonably permits an interpretation
'
tent," the Court opined that it "should adopt it.78
111. Intel Clarifies Whether the Directorate General Is a "Foreign
Tribunal"
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. ("AMD") and Intel Corporation ("Intel") compete in the microprocessor industry.79 AMD filed a complaint with the Directorate General ("DG") in Europe, claiming that Intel was abusing its dominant
market position in violation of Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome of the European
Union. 80 In connection with the investigation of the DG in Belgium, AMD filed
a petition in a California federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 178281 to obtain
transcripts and other documents from an antitrust case involving Intel being conducted in an Alabama federal district court. Section 1782 governs discovery
82
within the United States of information to be used in foreign legal proceedings.
Hence, the field of play is Belgium to California to Alabama, which seems like
the antitrust version of "Tinker to Evans to Chance. '83 The California District
Court agreed with Intel that the investigation of the DG was not a "proceeding in
the Ninth Circuit
a foreign or international tribunal" under section 1782,84 but 86
85 and the Court granted Intel's petition for certiorari.
reversed
The European Union

A.

The origin of the twenty-five-member European Union ("EU") can be traced
to a six-nation agreement reached in 1952 to establish the European Coal and
78 Id. at 2371-72.
79 See Andrews Antitrust Litig. Reporter, Discovery: 9th Cir. Says AMD Can Pursue Discovery Request for EC Proceeding, 10 No. 1 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 7 (2002).
80 Katherine Birmingham Wilmore, International Legal Developments in Review: 2002 Business
Transactions & Disputes, 37 INT'L LAW. 479, 494-95 (2003). For more information on Article 82 of the
Treaty of Rome, see Article 82 of the EC Treaty, available at http://europa.eu.int/comn/competition/
legislation/treaties/ec/art82_en.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
81 Originally, AMD wanted the E.C.'s directorate-general for competition to petition the U.S. courts
to obtain documents, but the directorate-general declined to do so. Gregory P. Joseph, International
Discovery, 26 NAT'L L. J. 48 (2004) available on Westlaw at 8/2/04 NLJ 12, (col. 1).
82 Wilmore, supra note 80, at 495 ("To support its complaint, AMD applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1782,
to the district court in California for access to documents and transcripts from a proceeding pending in
federal court in Alabama.").
83 Joe Tinker (SS), Johnny Evers (2B), and Frank Chance (IB) were the famous double play team of
the Chicago Cubs. They were elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame as a trio in 1946. Baseball Hall of
Fame, at http://www.baseballhalloffame.org/hofers and-honorees/extra/tinkereverschance.htm (last
visited May 6, 2004).
84 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter "Intel
I"](referencing the District Court's determination that the proceeding for which AMD seeks discovery
does not qualify under 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
85

Id.

86 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 531 (Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 02-0572).
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Steel Community ("ECSC"), which focused in part on price and output controls
and competition rules. Building on this agreement, the six nations formed the
European Community in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. One long-term goal of
the Treaty of Rome was the establishment of a common market. After some
"alarms and excursions," European leaders eventually negotiated and signed the
Treaty on European Union or the Maastricht Treaty, which went into effect November 1, 1993. One important objective of the Treaty was the creation of a
timetable for economic union. To this end, the Treaty of European Union established the European Commission ("EC"), which is the EU's competition law en-

forcement agency and one of five major institutions intended to advance the
goals of the EU. 87 The EC is like the Antitrust Division, Federal Trade Commis-

sion ("FTC"), and state attorneys general wrapped into one. 88 In the context of
this case, AMD brought its complaint about Intel to the DG, which is a subunit of
89
the EC.

B.

Article 82

AMD complained that Intel abused its dominant position in Europe in violation of Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome. 90 Article 82 prevents an enterprise that
occupies a dominant position within the EU market from abusing its dominance.
Such abuse is prohibited because it is incompatible with the objective of integrat91
ing the economies of Europe, which is one important purpose of the EU. To
state a claim under Article 82 (formerly Article 86), the following elements must
be present: (1) a dominant position of a relevant product and in a geographic
act; and (3) a potential appremarket within the common market; (2) an abusive
92
States.
Member
between
trade
on
effect
ciable
Article 82 is often compared with Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes monopolization or attempts to monopolize. 93 However, the parallel is not
87 This paragraph is freely adapted from Jeffrey M. Peterson, Unrest in the European Commission:
The Changing Landscape and Politicsof InternationalMergers for United States Companies, 24 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 377, 381-84 (2002).
88 But see id. at 400 ("In many ways, EU antitrust powers are lacking when compared to those of the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.").
89 Oliver Borgers et. al., InternationalAntitrust Law, 37 INT'L LAW. 305, 323-24 (2003).
90 Id.
91 See Mercer H. Harz, Dominance And Duty In The European Union: A Look Through Microsoft
Windows At The Essential Facilities Doctrine, II EMORY INT'L L. REv. 189, 194-95 (1996)(discussing
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome which is now Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome); James Kanter &
Alexei Barrionuevo, Airbus Rescinds Challenge to EU's Microsoft Order,WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2004, at
B3, avaliable on Westlaw at 9/24/04 WSJ B3 (reporting that in a prehearing filing related to the EU's
antitrust ruling against Microsoft Corp., the EU purportedly stated, "[tihe concept of abuse of a dominant
position does not exist in U.S. law").
92 James S. Venit, EU Competition Law-Enforcement and Compliance: An Overview, 65 ANaiTRUST L.J. 81, 83-84 (1996) (discussing Article 86 which is now Article 82).
93 See Thomas 1. Horton & Stefan Schmitz, The Lessons of Covisint: Regulating B2Bs Under European and American Competition Laws, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1231, 1237 (2001-02) (stating Article 82 is
roughly parallel to Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Romano Subiotto & Filippo Amato, The Reform Of
The European Competition Policy Concerning Vertical Restraints, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 193 n.1
(2001) (stating Article 82 roughly corresponds to Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Moritz Ferdinand
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direct. Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires a monopoly, but Article 82 only
requires a dominant position. 94 Hence, a monopolization forbidden by the Sherman Act differs from the abuse of dominant position forbidden by Article 82 of
the Treaty of Rome. 95 Under Article 82, for example, a company may be thought
to have a dominant position with a market share of 40%, but under the Sherman
96
Act a market share of 40% would not be construed as "monopoly power.
One reason for the difference between the concept of dominant position and
monopoly power involves the purpose of competition policy. The purpose of
U.S. policy is the maximization of consumer welfare, but the purpose of EU
97
As Mario Monti 98
policy is protecting competition by protecting competitors.
of the European Commission explained, the "goal of competition policy, in all its
aspects, is to protect consumer welfare by maintaining a high degree of competition in the common market." 99
The proposed $40 billion merger of General Electric and Honeywell illustrates
the practical implications of this difference in approach. General Electric was
prevented by the EC from acquiring Honeywell even though the Antitrust Divi-

sion approved this merger. 100 A merger that was not a problem in the U.S. was a
problem in the EU. 10

C.

Section 1782

To advance its Article 82 complaint in Belgium, where the EC is located,
AMD wanted Intel documents from a case before a federal court in Alabama.
AMD petitioned a federal court in California to obtain those documents from the
Alabama court so it could use them to press its Article 82 complaint in Belgium.
Scharpenseel, Consequences of E.U. Airline Deregulationin the Context of the Global Aviation Market,
22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 91, 114 (2001) (stating Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act are similar).
94 Stefan Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision In GE/Honeywell And The Question of the
Goals of Antitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 539, 595 n.82 (2002).
95 Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement: Governance Issues and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 453-55 (2002).
96 ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN

COMPETIrION POLICY 676-77 (2002).
97 Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.

287, 295-96 (2002) ("Specifically, the goal of U.S. antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare, while the EC protects competition by protecting competitors.").
98 EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti handed over his job to his successor, Neelie Kroes, at
the end of October 2004. James Kanter, EU, Coke Nearing Antitrust Pact To Give Rivals More Shelf
Space, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2004, at BI0 available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56939796.
99 John Deq. Briggs & Howard T. Rosenblatt , GE/Honeywell-Live And Let Die: A Response to
Kolasky & Greenfield, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 459, 467 (2002).
100 John Deq. Briggs, Howard Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath of GE/Honeywell, 16
ANTITRUST

26, 26 (2001).

101 George Melloan, GE-Honeywell Exposes Flaws in Antitrust Policy,WALL. ST. J., June 26, 2001, at
A23, available at 2001 WL-WSI 2867701 (reporting that the main complaints came, from co3mpetitors
and not consumers). In the end, GE decided that it would rather not do this merger if it had to satisfy EU
demands to sell off chunks of Honeywell's business. Carol Hymowitz, IN THE LEAD: Jack Welch
ConfrontsA Difficult FinalAct To a Legendary Career,WALL ST. J., June 19, 2001, at B 1, available at
2001 WL-WSJ 2867000.
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AMD petitioned the California court under Section 1782 of the Judicial Code,
which allows the court to order discovery from a person within its jurisdiction for
use in a foreign proceeding. 0 2 Entitled "Assistance to foreign and international
tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals," section 1782 provides in pertinent part "[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
or
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document
10 3
tribunal."
international
or
a
foreign
in
proceeding
a
in
use
for
thing
other
Since 1855, federal law has permitted judicial assistance to foreign courts. At
first such assistance was somewhat restrictive, but the 1964 amendments to section 1782 greatly liberalized U.S. procedures for obtaining documentary evidence
in the United States. Drafted by the United States Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure, the amendments primarily (1) expanded the class of
litigation by substituting the word "tribunal" for the word "court" and by adding
international tribunals, (2) allowed private litigants to initiate the process, and (3)
deleted the requirement that the foreign litigation actually be pending.l°4
However, the first requirement of section 1782 is that there is a "proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal." Undoubtedly, a traditional lawsuit in some
whether an inquiry
court of law is a "proceeding,"'' 0 5 but there is doubt as1 0 to
6
conducted by an administrative body is a "proceeding."
D.

The Ninth Circuit's View

In simple terms, the District Court held that AMD's complaint before the DG
was not a proceeding under section 1782. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held
that any proceeding that is "related to a quasi-judicial or judicial proceeding"
qualifies under section 1782, stating that the "investigation being conducted by
[EC's] Directorate is related to a quasi-judicial or judicial proceeding." Therefore, "AMD has the right to petition the EC to stop what it believes is conduct
that violates the EC Treaty, to present evidence it believes support its allegations,
to have the EC evaluate what it presents and to have the resulting action (or
inaction) reviewed by the European courts." According to the Ninth Circuit, secand administion 1782 is "intended to be read broadly to include ' quasi-judicial
10 7
trative bodies and foreign investigating magistrates."
102
103

Borgers, supra note 89, at 323-24.
Assistance to Foreign and International Tribunals and to Litigants Before Such Tribunals 28

U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996).
104 See Application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
105 See John Fellas, Obtaining Evidence Located in the U.S. for Use in Foreign Litigation: 28 USC
§1782, 688 PLI/Lrr 63, 83 (2003) (stating that the word "tribunal" was substituted for "court" in the 1964
amendments in order to "make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional
courts") (citing S. Rep. 88-1580, 1964 USCCAN at 3788.)
106 Edward A. Klein, Recent Court Decisions have Addressed the Uncertaintiesin the FederalStatute
Permitting Foreign Discovery in the United States, 26 L.A. L.,w. 24, 26 (2003) ("However, it is tess
clear whether inquiries conducted by administrative bodies and other similar proceedings fall within the
terms of the statute.").
107 Id. (citing In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor's Office, 16 F. 3d 1016, 1019 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
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In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in support of Intel,108 the EC stated
that the "Ninth Circuit's holding fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the
European Commission."'10 9 According to the EC, "Tribunals decide the merits of
one party's claim against another. The Commission . . . never adjudicates disputes between parties." 110 Furthermore, "it does not adjudicate the rights of parties, as a tribunal would do. The parties to a complaint cannot be considered
'litigants' before a 'tribunal."' III The EC pointed out that "[t]he Court of First
Instance exercises judicial review of Commission decisions in the field of EC
competition law, subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of
law."1 12
To ensure that the United States Supreme Court would not misapprehend how
strongly the EC felt about this matter, the EC used unvarnished language to state
flatly: "This is a very serious matter. If the United States court's conclusion
undermines the effectiveness of the Commission's proceedings, for example
through chilling its Leniency Program and complicating the Commission§'s ability to assert the law enforcement privilege, this would be a breach of the principle
of international comity."113
The amicus brief of the EC seems somewhat overstated for three related reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the case law on section 1782 to
prepare a foundation for its decision. It also carefully delineated the process
followed by the DG to make the case that a DG investigation, albeit preliminary,
does in fact lead to quasi-judicial proceedings, and therefore, it qualifies as a
"proceeding before a tribunal" within the broad interpretation of section 1782.114
Second, in the United States, antitrust cases are heard by an impartial judge, but
in the EU antitrust proceedings are administrative proceedings conducted by the5
EC or the antitrust authorities and they may lead to restraint orders and fines." i
An EC decision with respect to mergers, for example, has "the power of an administrative act, as it is the decision of a national European authority."' 16 Third,
it has been observed that at least respect to the EU merger review the "EC's
Competition Directorate and its Competition Commissioner are effectively inves-

108 Brief of the Commission of the European Communities as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
2002 WL 32157391, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 531 (Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 02-0572).
109 Id.
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.

114 Intel I, 292 F.3d at 666-67.
115 Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement: Governance Issues and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 453-54 (2002).
116 Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the European Commission's
Blocking Of The General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 352-53 (2002).
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investigations and that due process
tigator, prosecutor, and judge in merger
' " 17
inadequate."
are
balances
checks and
E.

18
The U.S. Supreme Court's View"

The main holding of the Court in Intel is that there is no foreign discoverability requirement for section 1782 discovery. 1 9 Specifically, section 1782(a) "authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide assistance to a
complainant in a European Commission proceeding that leads to a dispositive
ruling, i.e., a final administrative action both responsive to the complaint and
reviewable in court."' 120 However, under section 1782, an applicant must show:
"(1) that the person from whom discovery is sought reside (or be found) in the
district of the district court to which the application is made, (2) that the discovery be for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal, and (3) that the application be made by a foreign or international tribunal or 'any interested person.' "121
In so holding, the Court in Intel systematically defined the limits of a court's
section 1782 discretion. 122 The Court:
Rejected that an "interested person" means only litigants, foreign sovereigns,
and a sovereign's designated agents,123 stating "[t]he text of [section] 1782(a),
,upon the application of any interested person,' plainly reaches beyond the uni1 24
verse of persons designated 'litigant.' ,
Declared, contrary to the pleas of the EC,125 that the EC is a "tribunal" within
1 26
the meaning of section 1782 when it acts as a first-instance decision-maker,
courts only by subreasoning that "AMD could 'use' evidence in the reviewing
127
mitting it to the [EC] in the current, investigative stage."'
Opined that the proceeding for which discovery is sought need not be imminent or pending, 1 28 holding that section 1782(a) "requires only that a dispositive
117 Janet L. McDavid, Proposed Reform of the EU Merger Regulation: A U.S. Perspective, 17-FALL
ANTITRUST 52, 52 (2002); Terry Calvani, InternationalEnforcement of Vertical Issues, SJ075 ALI-ABA
207, 224 (2004) ("Hell would freeze over before Congress gave the FTC such powers, and they might be
unconstitutional if they did.").
118 See Gregory P. Joseph, InternationalDiscovery, 26 Nat'l L. J. 48 (2004) available on Westlaw at
8/2/04 NLJ 12, (col. 1) (discussing Intel II succinctly but completely).
119 Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).
120 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2478.
121 In re Application of Guy, 2004 WL 1857580, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004) (slip opinion) (citing
Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2004) and applying Intel 11).
122 Schmitz, 376 F.3d at 84.
123 Wright & Miller Supplemental Service, Foreign Discovery, 8 FED. PRAC. & PROC. Civ.2d
§ 2005.1 (2004).
124 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2478.
125 Brief of the Commission of the European Communities, supra note 108.
126 Wright & Miller Supplemental Service, supra note 123.
127 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2479.
128 Andrews Antitrust Litig. Reporter, High Court Green-Lights Computer Chip Maker's Discovery
Request, 12 No. 4 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 10 (2004) [hereinafter "Andrews Antitrust Litg.
Reporter, High Court"].
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reviewable by the European courts, be within reasonaruling by the Commission,
129
ble contemplation."
Reasoned that the information need not be discoverable under the law of the
foreign jurisdiction, 130 observing that "[b]eyond shielding material safeguarded
by an applicable privilege, . . . nothing in the text of [section] 1782 limits a
be discovered in
district court's production-order authority to materials that could
1 31
the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there."
The Court also brushed aside policy arguments made by Intel involving comity and parity.' 32 With reference to parity, the Court made the commonsense
observation that "[w]hen information is sought by an 'interested person,' a district court could condition relief upon that person's reciprocal exchange of information." 133 With reference to comity, it merely stated that "[w]e question
whether foreign governments would in fact be offended by a domestic prescription permitting, but not requiring, judicial assistance."' 1 34 However, in his dissent
Mr. Justice Breyer observed that the EC is "entitled to deference." Citing to
Empagran,135 he concluded that "[i]n so ignoring the [EC], the majority undermines the comity interests [section] 1782 was designed to serve and disregards
the maxim that we construe statutes so as to 'hel[p] the potentially conflicting
laws of different nations work together in harmony ....111136
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that "a district court is not required to grant
a [section] 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to
do so.' 1 37 In this regard, "a court presented with a [section] 1782(a) request may
take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the foreign
proceedings underway, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court
or agency to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance."' 38 With this, the Court decided to allow "courts below to139assure an airing adequate to determine what, if
any, assistance is appropriate."'
IV.

Lower Courts Apply the Rules of Empagran and Intel

Within weeks of the Court's decisions, trial courts and courts of appeal applied
the rules of Empagran and Intel to decide cases before them. There are not many
129
130

Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
Andrews Antitrust Litig. Reporter, High Court, supra note 128.

131 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
132

id. at 2481.

133 Id. at 2482
134 Id. at

2481

Empagran 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 ("[This rule of statutory construction] thereby helps the potentially
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony-a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.").
136 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'35

137 Id. at 2482-83.
138

Id. at 2483.

139 Id. at 2484. The court below denied AMD's application for discovery "in full." See Advanced

Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., 2004 WL 2282320, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 4, 2004).
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cases, but those cases that have been decided provide an early indication of how
lower courts apply the rules of Empagran and Intel to resolve international antitrust issues. This section takes a closer look at such cases.
The Court also addressed comity in Empagran and Intel. Comity is a doctrine
that takes into account "foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and
the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal
regime."' 140 In Empagran, the Court emphasized the importance of comity, but in
Intel, it minimized its importance. This section also takes a closer look at comity
in Empagran and Intel and concludes that neither decision modified the Court's
narrow rule of comity announced in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California
("Hartford Fire Insurance").141
Applying the Rule of Empagran

A.

The rule of Empagran is that "where the defendant's conduct affects both
domestic and foreign commerce, but the plaintiff's injury arises only from the
conduct's foreign effect and not its domestic effect, the plaintiff's injury is independent from the domestic effect and the court has no jurisdiction."' 142 Three
cases, thus far, apply the rule of Empagran. In one case, the court dismissed the
complaint because the plaintiff s injury stemmed from foreign conduct. In a second case, the court remanded it to the trial court for the purpose of discovery. In
a third case, the court found that the plaintiff had stated a claim because the
injury was not independent of the domestic conduct.
The Second Circuit in Sniado affirmed the District Court's dismissal of
Sniado's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 43 His original complaint alleged an injury from excessive currency exchange fees; the injury,
though, occurred in Europe and stemmed from a price-fixing conspiracy between
European banks.144 Hence, Sniado's injury arose only from the conduct's forthe District Court in this case rightly decided that it
eign effect; consequently,
45
had no jurisdiction. 1
Sniado amended his complaint, alleging that his injury in Europe was somehow dependent (not independent) of the conspiracy's effect on United States
commerce, 14 6 thereby hoping to bring his claim within the ambit of the Empagran rule. The Second Circuit brushed aside this argument on the merits, stat140 Comity Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (Black-

mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing a "tripartite" analysis).
141 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
142 MM Global Serv. v. Dow Chem., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341-42 (D.Conn. 2004) (citing Empagran
II, 124 S. Ct. at 2363).
143 Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 378 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that "the amended complaint is facially insufficient to establish jurisdiction").
144 Id. at 212.
145
146

144

Id.
Id. at 213.
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ing that "such an inference, even if reasonable, is too conclusory to avert
dismissal."' 14 7 It also declined to remand the case for discovery.
In contrast, the Third Circuit did remand a case for the purpose of discovery.
BHP New Zealand involved allegations of a conspiracy "to artificially inflate
graphite electrode prices by establishing a global cartel that fixed prices.' 1 4 8 The
court, inter alia, remanded this case to the trial court to "give the parties the
opportunity to present evidence as to whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct's domestic effects were linked to the alleged foreign harm."' 149 To state a
claim under the rule of Empagran, plaintiffs must make a "preliminary showing

. . .

that the prices they paid for graphite electrodes were linked to, and not

prices in the United States by defendants' al'independent' from, the raising of
' 150
leged global price-fixing cartel."
A third case following Empagran involved an allegation that Union Carbide
and Dow compelled the plaintiffs to engage in a price maintenance conspiracy
with respect to the resale of Union Carbide products in India.' 5 ' It is a complicated antitrust case that began in Bhopal, India, when lethal gas escaped from a
chemical plant affiliated with Union Carbide, causing the death of 3,800 persons
and injuries to an additional 200,000. 152 The trial court stated that "jurisdiction is
authorized under the FTAIA only when the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants' conduct affected U.S. commerce and that the effect gave rise to the plaintiff's injury."'1 53 Applying this rule of Empagran, the trial court found that the
"complaint properly alleges that the defendants' conduct had an effect on compefrom the United States and the plaintiffs were injured as a result of
tition in and 54
that effect."'
In sum, these cases illustrate that courts will now exercise jurisdiction where
the domestic effects of anticompetitive conduct are linked to the foreign harm.
However, the rule of Empagran is not explicit about when a plaintiff's injury is
independent from the domestic effect and when it is not. Hence, in the years
to be as
ahead, the phrase "independent from the domestic effect," may prove
' 55
ambiguous to the courts as was the phrase, "gives rise to a claim."'
147
148

Id.
BHP N.Z. v. Ucar Int'l, 2004 WL 1771436, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2004) (slip opinion).

149 Id.

150

at *2.

Id.

151MM Global Serv. v. Dow Chem., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 340 (D.Conn. 2004).
152

Id. at 339.

153 Id.

at 341.

342.
155 In this regard, it should be interesting to follow developments in MM Global Services, supra note
142, because this case (1) may be more about the law of contracts than antitrust; (2) may involve conduct
that FTAIA intended to shield; and (3) may involve conduct that falls within the ambit of the Colgate
Doctrine, which provides in pertinent part that a manufacturer can announce the prices it wants its
dealers to charge and then refuse to sell to dealers who fail to adhere to those prices. United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
154 Id. at
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Applying the Rule of Intel

B.

The rule of Intel is that there is no foreign discoverability requirement. "[Section] 1782 (a) authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide
judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals or to 'interested person[s]'
in proceedings abroad."' 5 6 Moreover, "a court presented with a [section] 1782(a)
request may take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of
the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government
57 Two
or the court or the agency abroad to federal-court judicial assistance."'
cases, thus far, apply the rule of Intel. In one case, the court denied a request, in
part, because the "German government was obviously unreceptive to the judicial
assistance of an American federal court." 158 In another case, the court granted
the request, because there was no "reason to suppose that the government of the
United Kingdom would disfavor granting Applicants relief under [section]
1782."159
Schmitz involved a civil action in Germany.160 The action of the petitioners in
Germany alleged that the respondent Deutsche Telekom AG misled investors
when it overstated the value of real estate assets. Concurrently, the Public Prosecutor in Bonn, Germany was conducting a criminal investigation of similar allegations against former Deutsche Telekom employees.' 6' The District Court
for aid under section 1782(a), and the Second
denied the request of petitioners
62
decision.1
that
affirmed
Circuit
The District Court reasoned that "although petitioners had met the statutory
requirements of [section] 1782, granting discovery in this case would run counter
to the statute's aims of assisting foreign courts and litigants and encouraging
1 63
foreign jurisdictions to provide reciprocal assistance to American courts."'
Letters from the Bonn Prosecutor and the German Ministry of Justice opposed
section 1782(a) aid, because "production to petitioners at this time would compromise the ongoing criminal investigation in Germany and violate the rights of
potential criminal defendants there."' 64 In addition, the State Secretary of the
German Federal Ministry of Justice added that "[t]he Federal Government [of
of the documents
Germany] would respectfully like to submit that disclosure
1 65
concerned may jeopardize German sovereign rights."

Applying the rule of Intel, the Second Circuit found that the District Court had
not abused its discretion in denying section 1782(a) aid. The court observed that
156 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2473.

157 Id. at 2483.
158 Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).
159 In re Application of Guy, 2004 WL 1857580, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004).
160 Schmitz, 376 F.3d at 81.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 85 ("Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the district court
denying petitioners' request for discovery.").
163 Id. at 81.

164 Id. at 81-82.
165 Id. at 82 (citing a letter from State Secretary of the German Federal Ministry of Justice).
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"the German government was obviously unreceptive to the judicial assistance of
an American federal court."' 16 6 In this context, the District Court concluded and
the Second Circuit agreed that granting the request of petitioners would not promote the aims of section 1782. Granting such aid "would in fact encourage foreign countries to potentially disregard the sovereignty concerns1 67of the United
States and generally discourage future assistance to our courts."'
In contrast, the trial court in In re application of Guy granted section 1782(a)
aid, largely on the grounds that there was no "reason to suppose that the government of the United Kingdom would disfavor granting Applicants relief under
not to exercise its discre[section] 1782,"168 and there was no "persuasive reason
69
tion in favor of allowing discovery to Applicants." 1
In this case, applicants were residents of England and members of an accounting firm who had been appointed as administrators of the estate of a person who
had died intestate. 170 The decedent had been in the antiques business that operated as a partnership and transacted business in the U.S. 17 1 The applicant-accounting firm simply wanted "to gather, preserve, account for, and distribute the
estate of their decedent."' 72 In this regard, it sought discovery aid with reference
to transactions with nonparties in the U.S. Applying the rule of Intel the court
had no difficulty granting this application, stating that "[r]espondents are not parties to the English Action, but that in no way exempts them from [section] 1782,
which, the Supreme Court has pointed out, may be the only way in a foreign
proceeding to obtain information from third-party witnesses in the United
States." 173
Finally, the Commission of European Communities ("Commission") argued,
inter alia, that "characterizing the Commission as a 'tribunal' poses serious
threats to its anti-cartel Leniency Program by jeopardizing the Commission's
ability to maintain the confidentiality of documents submitted to it."' 17 4 The Leniency Program involves cartel participants who75confess their own wrongdoing,
presumably, in exchange for lenient treatment.'
166 Id. at

84.

167 Id. at 85 (citing In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F.Supp.2d 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y.2003)).
168 In re Application of Guy, 2004 WL 1857580 at *2.
169 Id.

at *3.

170 Id. at *1.
171 Id.
172 Id.

173 Id. at *2 (citing Intel IL 124 S. Ct. at 2483).
174 Brief of the Commission of the European Communities as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal,
2003 WL 23138389, *4, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corporation, 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 531 (Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 02-0572) [hereinafter "Brief of the Commis-

sion of the European Communities, Reversal"].
175 "Amnesty and leniency programs are all based on creating sufficient positive incentives for the
amnesty/leniency applicant to come forward and expose the cartel." Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History-What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend To
Others?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 400 (2004). The European Union adopted its leniency policy
in 1996. John Anthony Chavez & Harvey I. Saferstein, InternationalCartelsAnd Their Significance To
Compliance Programs, 1311 PLI/CoRP 1031, 1039 (2002).
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With respect to this program, the Commission opined that if the "Commission
were deemed a 'tribunal' in the competition context, it could find itself no longer
able to guarantee the confidentiality of those Leniency Program confessions by,
1 76
inter alia, resort to the law enforcement privilege wherever necessary."'
Whether the decision of the Court in Intel will have a chilling effect upon the
Commission's Leniency Program is an empirical question, which will be answered in the fullness of time. However, the cases discussed above seem to
indicate that federal courts would be attuned to the concerns of the Commission,
as they consider section 1782(a) applications that may have implications for the
Commission's Leniency Program.
C.

177
Comity Is "A Blend of Courtesy and Expedience"'

Both Empagran and Intel reference comity. The Supreme Court provided a
classic definition of comity in 1895:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citi78
zens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 1
In Empagran the Court relied on comity to support its decision, stating that
"principles of prescriptive comity counsel against the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the FTAIA."' 79 Conversely, in Intel, the Court brushed aside the argument of Intel and the Commission that considerations of comity should control
the decision. The Court doubted that "foreign governments would be offended
1 80
by a domestic prescription permitting, but not requiring, judicial assistance."
Mr. Justice Breyer-who wrote the Court's opinion in Empagran where he relied
on comity-dissented in Intel, stating that the "majority undermines the comity
interests [that] [section] 1782 was designed to serve," when it "disregards the
Commission's opinion ....",181
Taken together, Empagran and Intel may have sent a mixed message about
comity in antitrust. For at least three reasons, though, this "mixed message" (to
the extent that one exists) should have no enduring implications for the Court's
main rule of comity stated in Hartford Fire Insurance. First, the Court relied on
comity in Empagran in connection with its application of a rule of construction
Brief of the Commission of the European Communities, Reversal, supra note 174, at *15.
177 Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir.1969); see also In
re Maxwell Communication, 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing legal standard associated
with international comity).
178 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,164 (1895).
179 Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
180 Intel II, 124 S. Ct. at 2481.
181 Id. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2366).
176
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for ambiguous legislation. 182 That rule provides "legislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States." 183 Consistent with this rule and mindful of comity, the
Court concluded
that Congress did not intend to impose America's antitrust laws
1 84
on the world.
Second, as between the U.S. and Europe, there has been a narrowing of their
consideration of international comity in antitrust matters. 185 Notwithstanding
federal government guidelines providing that the Department of Justice and the
FTC will consider international comity in enforcing the antitrust laws, 186 at this
point, neither 87the U.S. nor Europe favor applying the principles of comity in
antitrust law. 1
Third, there has been a narrowing of comity consideration, in part, because the
Supreme Court has actually "gutted" the doctrine of comity of "virtually all of its
vitality" in its decision in Hartford Fire Insurance.188 In Hartford Fire Insurance, the Court permitted extraterritorial extension of the Sherman Act in a case
involving alleged violations of several foreign re-insurers, accused of conspiring
with domestic insurers "to influence the availability of certain coverages in the
American commercial insurance market."1 89 In its holding, "the Supreme Court
made clear . . . that no conflict exists for purposes of an international comity
analysis in the courts if the person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both." 190 Hence, the "Court narrowed the comity inquiry to the
sole question of whether U.S. law prohibits what foreign law requires." 19 1 This
narrow rule necessarily limits a trial court's considerations of comity in deciding
182 Telephone interview with Spencer Weber Waller, Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law (Sept. 14, 2004).
183 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
184 Empagran II, 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
William Sugden, Global Antitrust And The Evolution Of An InternationalStandard, 35 VAND. J.
L. 989, 1015 (2002).
186 DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 3.2 Comity, April
1995, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/intemat.htm.
187 Yeo Jin Chun, The GE-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement Of Antitrust/Competition
Laws Across The Atlantic Pond, 15 N.Y. I, 'L L. REv. 61, 69 (2002) ("Both legal regimes do not favor
applying the principles of comity in antitrust law."); see also Julian Epstein, The Other Side Of Harmony:
Can Trade And Competition Laws Work TogetherIn The InternationalMarketplace?, 17 AM. U. IrNT'L L.
REv. 343, 347-49 (2002) (discussing the history of comity).
188 Spencer Weber Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 105, 134-43 (2002) (discussing the "The
Gutting of Comity"); see also Brian Peck, ExtraterritorialApplication Of Antitrust Laws And The U.S.EU Dispute Over The Boeing And McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity To Conflict?An Argument
For A Binding InternationalAgreement On Antitrust Enforcement And Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 1163, 1183 (1998) ("Several commentators believe that the Hartford Fire decision has
"swept away" the concept of comity ... ").
189 James S. McNeill, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Jurisdiction: Continuing The Confusion In Policy,
Law, And Jurisdiction,28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 425, 426 (1998).
190 DOJ & FTC, supra note 186.
185
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191 Salil K. Mehra, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement And The Myth Of International Consensus,
10 DuKE J. COMP. & IqT'L L. 191, 193 (1999).
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whether to exercise its jurisdiction. 192 Neither Empagran nor Intel has any effect
on this narrow rule.
IV.

Conclusion: "It's Tough to Make Predictions, Especially About the

Future." 193

The convergence of competition policy is important to foster free trade, to
investigate and prosecute global cartels, to regulate companies international in
scope, and to eliminate duplicate and conflicting policies and procedures. 194 The
EC's decision to block the merger of General Electric Co. and Honeywell International Inc. underscores the importance of convergence. 195
Arguably, both Empagranand Intel facilitated the convergence of competition
policy. First, Empagranreinforced the long-standing rule that conduct must have
a domestic effect. 196 Otherwise, a federal court cannot exercise jurisdiction.
This sends a signal once again to the international community that the federal
courts are not open to anyone who has an antitrust claim somewhere in the world.
In the long run, this should encourage the international community to work together to develop more global competition policies and mechanisms to enforce
those policies. Second, Intel established that federal courts have the discretion to
facilitate the discovery process in international proceedings. In the long run, this
should enhance the capacity of parties in the international arena to obtain documents and pursue antitrust claims in their own courts or in multilateral tribunals.
Although Empagran and Intel will make contributions to the convergence of
international competition policy, they may also have troublesome consequences.
Both decisions give trial courts tremendous discretion to answer tough questions.
With respect to Empagran, trial courts will likely be enmeshed like a cat in yarn
deciding whether the domestic effect is independent of the foreign effect.
Whatever a trial court decides, the case will surely be appealed. Soon, there may
be a split in the Circuits regarding the substantive meaning of "independent."
The Court will then have to revisit FTAIA and explain the meaning of the Empagran phrase, "independent of any adverse domestic effect."197
Similarly, Intel provides trial courts wide discretion in granting section
1782(a) aid: "[t]he statute authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court
to provide assistance to a complainant . ,,198 In reaching their decisions, trial
192 Robert C. Reuland, HartfordFire Insurance Co., Comity, and the ExtraterritorialReach of United
States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 161 (1994).
193 See William E. Lee, Facts, Assumptions and American Pie, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
239, 252 n.61 (2000) (quoting Yogi Berra).
194 Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories Of Global Governance: A Case Study Of InternationalAntitrust
Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 225 (2003) (discussing reasons for seeking convergence).
195 Deborah A. Garza, Transatlantic Antitrust: Convergence Or Divergence, 16 ANTITRUST 5, 5
(2001).
196 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that it is "well
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States").
197 Empagran I1,124 S.Ct. at 2366.
124 S. Ct. at 2478.
198 Intel II,
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courts will have to balance multiple considerations including questions of comity. Precisely how they will do this is uncertain. In the context of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in antitrust cases, for example, the Court eventually rejected a balancing test 19 9 and announced a narrow, bright-line rule related to considerations
of comity. 2°° At some point, the Court may have to revisit its holding in Intel
and narrow the discretion of trial courts to achieve more reliable, i.e. predictable,
results under section 1782.
The rules of Empagranand Intel will advance long-term convergence in international antitrust. In the years ahead, they will be modified or supplemented in
some way, simply because Supreme Court decisions of this type often answer
some questions while simultaneously posing others. The Court, after all, is
merely final, not infallible. 20 1 For now, however, the rules of Empagran and
Intel provide lower courts conceptual tools to resolve tough questions in internasure to come their way. How they use them should be fascinating
tional antitrust,
20 2
behold!
to

199 Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards Through The SarbanesOxley Act: Unilateralism Or Cooperation?,53 DUKE L.J. 833, 860 (2003).
200 See Spencer Weber Waller, The United States As Antitrust Courtroom To The World: Jurisdiction
And Standing Issues In TransnationalLitigation, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 523, 526-28 (discussing
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California., 509 U.S. 764 (1993)).
201 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) ("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final.").
202 Waller, supra note 200, at 528 ("Sometimes you have the lower courts engaged in what law
professors have called guerilla warfare, where you have a rule that the Supreme Court enunciates that just
doesn't take for some reason.").
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